Who Shot the Bullets?

Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace

Guillermo Kreiman * **Juan Masullo**

University of Oxford University of Oxford

February 2020

Forthcoming in ***Latin American Politics and Society***

Abstract

Does exposure to violence affect attitudes towards peace? Civilians living in warzones are likely to see peace agreements as an opportunity to improve their security prospects. However, in multi-party conflicts this does not automatically translate into support for peace. Support hinges on the interplay between which faction has victimized civilians in the past and which faction is sitting at the negotiation table. If civilians have been victimized by the group that is involved in the peace agreement, they will likely support peace. On the contrary, if they have been victimized by another faction, they will likely refrain from supporting peace if they believe that this can trigger retaliatory violence against them. We explore this argument empirically in the context of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC; both quantitative and qualitative data yield support to our theoretical expectations.

Keywords: Attitudes Towards Peace; Colombia; Violence; Peace Agreement; FARC; Paramilitaries.

*Corresponding author:guillermo.kreiman@politics.ox.ac.uk

1 Introduction

Different strands of literature have established that violence has the power to shape people's social and political preferences and behaviors. In the last decade, a rapidly growing body of research on the effects of wartime violence has established that exposure to violence can make people more cooperative and altruistic (see Bauer et al. 2016 for a meta-analysis). Similarly, a well-developed literature on political legacies has shown that experiences of violence can have a long-term impact on electoral behaviour (Balcells 2012; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Costalli and Ruggeri 2018; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017; Zhukov and Talibova 2018). In addition, an emerging field on the "politics of crime" has found that victimization can shape policy preferences regarding how to combat crime (García-Ponce, Young, and Zeitzoff 2018; Masullo and Morisi 2019; Visconti 2019). If exposure to violence has such power to transform peoples' political preferences and behaviors, does variation in experiences of violence also translate into different attitudes towards peace?

This paper explores this question in the context of Colombia's 2016 peace referendum, in which a razor-thin majority opposed a peace agreement painstakingly reached by the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010 – 2018) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The spatial pattern of the vote and the geographical variation of violence during the war offer a rich opportunity to explore whether different experiences of violence have a differential impact on attitudes towards peace.

Rather than looking at violence *in general*, we contend that the identity of the perpetrator – who shot the bullets – matters when it comes to the effect of exposure to violence on attitudes towards peace. We argue that civilians' decisions about whether to support peace are guided by their desire to minimize post-agreement violence. In multiparty conflicts, when peace agreements involve some armed groups and not others, civilians' expectations of post-agreement violence are shaped by an interplay between which armed group has been their main victimizer and which group is sitting at the negotiation table. When civilians have been mostly victimized by the group negotiating peace, support for the agreement will be higher, as they have good reasons to believe that violence by that group will decrease. However, if their main victimizer is not sitting at the negotiating table, civilians not only lack reasons to believe that violence by that group will decrease, but they could also fear violent retribution for supporting peace with

another faction. Consequently, support for the agreement will be lower among this subset of the population.

Our empirical analysis provides supporting quantitative and qualitative evidence for this argument. We find that support for the 2016 peace referendum in Colombia was conditional on *who* inflicted the harm: people living in areas mostly affected by FARC violence were more supportive of the peace deal, while support was lower among those inhabiting localities mostly affected by paramilitary violence. This finding holds against different model specifications and several robustness checks. Qualitative testimonies collected in conflict-affected areas provide support for the internal logic of the proposed argument.

This study makes two core contributions. First, it shows that "who shot the bullets" matters, suggesting that a more disaggregated treatment of "violence" can help further advance research on both the effects of exposure to violence and citizens' support for peace. Second, it proposes a new relevant outcome – attitudes for peace – to be explored in the growing literature on the effects of exposure to violence. In doing so, and by proposing a theory of why experiences of violence by different groups can have a differential effect on peace attitudes in multi-party conflicts, this study adds nuance to recent efforts to explain the unexpected outcome of Colombia's 2016 peace referendum.[1] A better understanding of the determinants of support for peace is crucial for the prospects of securing peace in Colombia and in other countries transitioning from war to peace, as the successful implementation of peace agreements is likely to require high levels of public support and local buy-in (Hayes and McAllister 2001; Mckeon 2005; Nilsson 2012).

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 broadly reviews the literature on the link between exposure to violence and attitudes towards peace and Section 3 summarizes the historical roots of the Colombian conflict and the political context in which the peace referendum took place. In Section 4, we propose a theoretical argument as to why the identity of the perpetrator should matter for attitudes towards peace. We also derive and specify observable implications for the Colombian case. Section 5 describes the data and methodology, and Section 6 presents and discusses the main results of our empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.

[1] See special issue edited by Flores and Vargas (2018) and articles by Pachenkina and Gamboa (2019), Matanock and García-Sánchez (2017), Masullo and Morisi (2019a) and Tellez (2019a, 2019b).

2 Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace

The emerging literature on violence exposure and attitudes towards peace has so far yielded mixed results. On the one hand, several studies have contended that experiences of violence are central in understanding people's attitudes towards peace. However, findings do not converge when it comes to the nature of the relationship. Some have found that violence reduces support for key dimensions related to peace and conflict termination. For example, Canetti et al. (2013) and Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) found that in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, individual-level exposure to violence has shifted people away from compromise and conciliatory policies. Similarly, studying Northern Ireland, Hewstoe et al. (2006) found that people that had negative experiences of "The Troubles" report lower levels of forgiveness. In stark contrast, other studies have found that violence exposure can spur pro-peace attitudes. For example, Hazlett (2019) found that refugees from Darfur that were directly affected by the wave of violence in the early 2000s were less supportive of harsher punishment and more likely to believe that peace was possible. Yet, other studies have yielded mixed results. In the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, for instance, Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward (2009) found that while personal experiences of violence decreased people's willingness to forgive, living in the proximity of communities with high levels of violent incidents made preferences for forgiveness more likely.

On the other hand, a series of studies have casted doubt on the centrality of exposure to violence al together, suggesting that other variables take the front seat when it comes to explaining attitudes towards peace. For example, focusing on the 2001 Macedonian civil conflict, Dyrstad et al. (2011) found that ethnicity trumps all other individual and contextual factors – including exposure to violence – in explaining people's support for the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the deal that brought the conflict to an end. Exploring citizens' attitudes towards peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Newman (2012) found that present conditions – largely related to lack of trust in Arab aspirations – rather than past experiences of conflict are what really help us to understand Israeli unwillingness to make concessions for peace.

Findings are similarly conflicting in the literature exploring attitudes towards peace in the Colombian civil war. This became readily clear in the days immediately after the 2016 peace referendum, when analysts and scholars offered preliminary analysis of the spatial patterns of the vote. While some argued that support for the peace referendum

was generally higher in war zones and that people who had suffered the most from violence tended to vote in favor (Fergusson and Molina 2016), others contended that people living under FARC's control voted against the deal as strongly negative attitudes towards the group prevailed in these areas.[2] Yet others claimed that the presence or absence of conflict was not a central factor explaining vote choice (Morelo 2016).

If one looks beyond the referendum, evidence is equally conflicting. For example, analyzing the 2014 presidential elections, Weintraub, Vargas and Flores (2015) found that Juan Manuel Santos – the pro-peace candidate – performed well in communities with moderate levels of violence, but poorly in communities with very high and low levels. Relying on 2014 AmericasBarometer survey data, which included a question on support for the then ongoing peace process, Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) found that existing political preferences overwhelmingly drove attitudes towards the peace process with FARC, not experiences of violence (see also Brodzinsky 2016).

Not being able to adjudicate between these competing accounts is unfortunate, given the theoretical and policy importance of the debate. How can future research help overcome this impasse? One way is to further disaggregate the key terms of the relationship – that is, "exposure to violence" and "peace". Some scholars have begun to disaggregated "peace", finding that, for example, the peace agreement overall was more popular than some of its specific provisions (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018; Tellez 2019a). However, few studies have attempted to unpack "exposure to violence".[3] In this study we disaggregate exposure to violence by "who shot the bullets". To be sure, we are not the first to examine the effects of perpetrator identity on civilian attitudes (see, e.g., Gallego 2018; Lupu and Wallace 2019; Lyall 2010; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to do so in the specific context of attitudes towards peace.

[2]See short interview with James Robinson: https://twitter.com/UChicago/status/783704638231023619 [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

[3]A recent exception is Pachenkina and Gamboa (2019), who explore the effects of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence on peace policy preferences. In the broader literature on exposure to wartime violence, some have explored the effects of different forms of targeting – indiscriminate or collective (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017; Zhukov and Talibova 2018) – and types of warfare – symmetric and asymmetric (Krakowski 2019).

3 Context Overview

3.1 The Colombian Civil War

The ongoing Colombian civil war dates back to the 1960s, being one of the longest in the world. Throughout the last five decades, the war has involved several active left-wing guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary armies, and the forces of the Colombian state. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, guerrilla groups managed to significantly expand their territorial control and notoriously increased their military capacity. Among the several guerrilla groups operating in the country, the FARC – founded in 1964 – rapidly became the largest and most powerful.[4]

The geographical expansion of guerrilla groups increasingly threatened the (largely economic) interests and security of local and regional elites. Tired of extortions, kidnappings and assassinations in the 1980s, large landowners, cattle ranchers, agro-exporters and drug traffickers responded to the threat by setting up private self-defense armies. While initially organized as various independent regional groups, the most prominent of these armies created the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997. The AUC, a rightwing, anti-insurgent paramilitary federation of national scope, rapidly became FARC's fiercest enemy. With the overt support of local and regional elites, and the (sometimes) subtle support of the Colombian army, the AUC's counterinsurgent campaign led to one of the bloodiest periods of the Colombian conflict (Romero 2003).

Competing for civilian loyalties, armed groups fighting in the Colombian civil war have disproportionally victimized civilians. According to the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH), about 200.000 people were killed between 1958 and 2012, of which over 80% were civilians (CNMH 2013).[5] While every non-state and state armed group has played its part in this bloody war, the FARC and the paramilitaries – especially the latter – have accounted for a disproportionate number of civilians casualties (Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2004).

In the mid-2000s, the AUC demobilized. However, the demobilization process spawned

[4]Second to FARC has been the National Liberation Army (ELN), also created in 1964 and active by the time of writing.

[5]These figures provide only a glimpse of the extent to which the Colombian population has been exposed to violence. Civilians have been also victims of a wide variety of non-lethal violence, including extortion, kidnapping, displacement or sexual violence. The report *Basta Ya!* by the CNMH provides a detailed picture of the different forms of victimization prevalent in the war.

several smaller armed groups known as "criminal bands" (BACRIM – from the Spanish *bandas criminales*) which are still active in various regions. Many BACRIM were formed by former AUC members and controlled some of the same areas the paramilitaries had held. Given these continuities, some analysts refer to them as "neo-paramiltiaries" (Granada, Restrepo, and Tobón García 2009) and many civilians on the ground actually call them *'paracos'* (Colombian slang for paramilitaries).

These groups are mostly interested in profiting from illegal markets, do not have a clear anti-insurgent agenda, and most lack the military capacity to directly confront larger armed groups. Nevertheless, to control the areas where their economic interests are settled, they have competed for civilian loyalties against other armed groups, including the FARC, and have recurrently used violence to ensure civilian collaboration and prevent defections. More important for this study, they have openly declared their opposition to the peace process (Arjona 2016a, 90).

3.2 The Peace Process with the FARC

During the eight years of Uribe's administration (2002–2010), the Colombian military was able to severely weaken the rebels, undermining their military capacity and killing some of the organization's most prominent leaders. Peace negotiations, by contrast, took place when Uribe's defense minister and successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010.[6] Following secret rapprochements between the Santos government and a militarily weakened FARC, peace talks formally began in October 2012.

The intense negotiation process eventually led to the announcement of a bilateral ceasefire in June 2016. In September 2016, a final agreement was reached and signed. This included important provisions for a comprehensive rural reform, permission for FARC to participate in elections, a strategy to curb coca cultivation and stop drug trafficking, and truth and justice for victims.[7]

Santos called for a referendum to give Colombians the opportunity to directly ratify and legitimize the agreement. Despite polls predicting wide support for the agreement, Colombians rejected it by a razon-thin margin of 0.5% on 2nd October. Santos and the FARC returned to the negotiation table, revised the document, and signed an amended

[6]Before 2012, three different governments unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate peace with FARC in 1984, 1991 and 1998 (see González Posso 2014 and Nasi 2009).

[7]For a detailed analysis of this peace process, see Nasi and Rettberg (2019).

version in November 2016. Deciding against popular ratification this time, Santos finally passed the agreement through the Colombian Congress. Despite deep challenges in the implementation of the agreement, the end of the conflict with the FARC today seems irreversible: combatants have disarmed and demobilized and the FARC has become a legal political party.

Paradoxically, the decision to have a democratic consultation to seal the deal provided a platform for elites seeking to upend the peace process (Matanock and García-Sánchez 2017), transforming the referendum campaign into "a battle of narratives between divided elites" (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018, 15). In the run up to the referendum, while Santos and his national coalition strongly promoted the agreement, a political faction led by Uribe, fiercely campaigned against, framing the final agreement as excessively lenient on the FARC.

The promoters of the No criticized the agreement as being too indulgent and giving unjustified concessions to the rebels, claiming that it promoted a culture of impunity. The opposition managed to successfully frame the agreement as a gift to the FARC, "rewarding" them for decades of war and violence. Voting in favor of it came to be seen, for many, as signal of FARC support.

Given this intense campaign leading up to the referendum, the high levels of political polarization that characterized the peace process, and the complexity of the agreement (laid out in a 300-page agreement!), scholars have looked at how both the referendum campaign and the design of the agreement shaped people's vote. In fact, some of the agreement's provisions and concessions (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2018; Tellez 2019a) and the role of campaign information and arguments (Masullo and Morisi 2019a) have been found to have shaped Colombians' attitudes towards the peace agreement. In this paper we take a different perspective and explore whether exposure to violence shaped vote choice in the 2016 referendum. In particular, we investigate whether exposure to violence by the FARC as opposed to violence by the paramilitaries/BACRIM had an observable impact on vote choice.

4 Why Should the Identity of the Perpetrator Matter for Civilian Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements?

In civil wars – especially those fought irregularly – violence against civilians is unequally distributed throughout the territory and thus affects the population unevenly (Kalyvas 2006). Civilians going through the same war can have diametrically different experiences of violence. Depending on where they live, they might experience high, low, or negligible levels of violence. Moreover, civilians might be affected more by one faction than the others. We contend that these different experiences have differential effects on people's attitudes towards peace.

Our argument rests on a minimal assumption: civilians living in war zones have a baseline preference for reducing harm against them and their communities. As recent research on civilian agency in conflict settings has consistently found, civilians appreciate safety and make choices they believe will help them minimize the chances of further violence. We contend that a desire to reduce the possibility of future victimization shapes civilian attitudes towards peace because achieving peace – or at least ensuring a definitive ceasefire and/or having armed actors give up their weapons and demobilize – will likely have a strong impact on the safety conditions of those living in war zones.[8]

Populations that have experienced violence in their localities and assess that violence may plausibly be directed at them in the future are particularly likely to be willing to bring the conflict to an end. As a negotiated settlement is an expedient way to do so, it is reasonable to expect that people living in warzones would exhibit a positive attitude towards peace agreements.[9] However, deriving the expectation that exposure to violence

[8]This has been the case, for example, for decisions to both collaborate (Kalyvas 2006) and refuse to cooperate with armed groups (Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2017), as well as to displace (Lozano-Garcia et al. 2010; Steele 2009) and stay put (Krakowski 2017; Masullo 2015).

[9]This baseline expectation is shared and empirically supported by recent studies on attitudes towards peace in civil conflict (see, e.g., Hazlett 2019; Pechenkina and Gamboa 2019; Tellez 2019a). We reckon, however, that it is at odds with findings from the "politics of crime" literature, consistently showing that victims of crime tend to be more supportive of "iron fist" approaches (e.g., Bateson 2012; Malone 2010; Masullo and Morisi 2019; Visconti 2019). The setting of criminal violence and civil war differ in ways that are potentially consequential for our argument. Supporting "hawkish approaches" is likely to be more costly (in the form of, e.g., armed clashes, counterinsurgency operations, violent retribution, etc.) for those who live in warzones in civil war than for those who live in the commonly more urban and circumspect setting of violent crime. In the latter, a large share of "iron fist" promoters do not live in the areas where most of the violence happens and where violent retribution is more like to take place.

in general translates into more support for peace implies assuming that the effects of violence are symmetrical and that civilian attitudes are indifferent to the identity of the perpetrator. The theoretical argument that we advance here moves away from this "symmetric effects assumption" (as in work by Lupu and Wallace 2019; Lyall 2010; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013)[10] and contends that "who shot the bullets" mediates the effect of exposure to violence on civilians' support for peace.

In multi-party conflicts – i.e., where more than one non-state armed group operates – governments commonly negotiate peace with a specific armed group or set of groups, but rarely include every fighting armed faction. In this sense, peace agreements are normally "incomplete" and the peace they bring about is "partial" at best (Franke and Öztürk 2015; Prem et al. 2018). Successfully sealing peace will likely lead to a decrease in violence by the group(s) involved in the negotiations but other factions may continue to operate and civilians may therefore remain at risk of violence. Given civilians' safety-seeking considerations, what shapes the way in which exposure to violence affects civilians' attitudes towards peace is the interplay between which groups victimized civilians in the recent past and which groups are sitting at the negotiating table.

A stylized version of our argument runs as follows. Two opposing non-state armed groups, Group A and Group B, are operating in a civil war. The government is in peace negotiations *only* with Group A. If the negotiations are successful, violence perpetrated by Group A is likely to fall drastically or even cease completely. In this situation, civilians will likely believe that their safety situation will significantly improve. Hence, they are likely to support the agreement. However, this reasoning will be particularly applicable for civilians living in areas where Group A has had a violent presence in the recent past and, therefore, would be expected to continue causing harm in the absence of an agreement.

At the same time, civilians have no reasons to believe that violence from Group B will decrease. On the contrary, as the agreement is likely to grant concessions to Group A, civilians supporting it may fear retaliatory violence by Group B which might see pro-peace civilians as sympathetic to the other faction. This will particularly be the case for civilians living in areas where Group B has committed violence in the recent past and is

[10]For example, Lyall, Blair, and Imai's (2013) found that while violence by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afganistan decreased support for the ISAF and increased support for the Taliban, Taliban violence only marginally decreased support for the Taliban and did not translate into more support for ISAF.

expected to continue harming civilians.[11]

The dynamics of a multi-party conflict and civilians' natural desire to minimize future violence push civilians to think strategically when deciding to support a peace agreement. Even if someone has an underlying preference for bringing a conflict with one armed group to an end via a peace agreement, that person might not support peace to avoid potential retribution from those groups that still operate in the conflict. As we have seen in other repressive contexts, safety-seeking considerations and fear are likely to push civilians to publicly falsify their private preferences with important social and political consequences (Kuran 1991, 1995).

From this theoretical logic, we derive the two expectations below. They both reflect observable asymmetries in how exposure to violence can shape support for peace agreements:

- In areas where Group A has committed most of the violence, residents are more likely to support a peace agreement with Group A.
- In areas where Group B has committed most of the violence, residents are more likely to refrain from supporting a peace agreement with Group A.[12]

The Colombian case fits the basic structure of the argument well. First, the Colombian civil war is a multiparty conflict in which several non-state enemy factions are active. Second, the 2016 peace agreement involved only one of these armed groups – the FARC. Third, among the other non-state armed groups active in the country, there were factions that opposed FARC and competed with it for civilian allegiances. While the AUC – the quintessential enemy of the FARC – had demobilized in 2006, several BACRIM – or neo-paramilitaries – were still active during the negotiation period and the referendum. Fourth, the 2016 peace agreement granted important concessions to FARC that were seen as incommensurate and unjustified by the opposition, including the BACRIM.

[11] We assume that, on average, civilians expect that future violence will most likely come from the same group that has victimized them in the past. This assumption is both intuitive and largely consistent with testimonies collected in the field.

[12] Unlike studies on the asymmetrical effects of violence on civilian attitudes, we do not take asymmetry as deriving from intergroup bias – the tendency to interpret actions of one's own in-group in a more favorable light than those of the out-group – resulting from ideological resonance and/or ethnic identification. We contend that ethnic and/or ideological attachments are not necessary for asymmetric effects to emerge: the identity of the armed actor matters for safety-seeking considerations.

Under these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for those living in warzones to believe that FARC violence would largely recede or even stop fully if a peace agreement was reached. Equally, it would have been reasonable to believe that paramilitary or BACRIM violence would be left unaffected or even increase. As supporting the peace agreement could be easily taken by opposing forces as a sign of support for the FARC, civilians could well believe that the paramilitaries/BACRIM might punish perceived pro-peace individuals. As it had happened in the past, it would not have been unreasonable for civilians to believe that the paramilitaries/BACRIM could use electoral results as a proxy of civilian allegiances and target "disloyal" individuals – an unintended consequence of democratization in conditions of persistent conflict (Steele 2017; Steele and Schubiger 2018).

Therefore, rather than expecting exposure to violence to have a uniform, symmetric effect on attitudes towards the 2016 peace agreement, we expect the effect on attitudes to be conditional on which armed group had victimized civilians in the recent past. Concretely, we expect that municipalities that were exposed mostly to FARC violence would see stronger support for the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum. Connectedly, we expect that municipalities that were exposed mostly to paramilitary/BACRIM violence would exhibit stronger opposition to the agreement.

5 Data and Methods

Our outcome variable is the percentage of votes per municipality supporting the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum.[13] Our independent variable, exposure to violence, is displayed in two different ways. First, we use a set of variables that allow us to capture *overall* exposure to violent attacks in each municipality. Second, in order to tap into "who shot the bullets", we use two independent variables, "(ln) FARC Attacks" and "(ln) paramilitary/ BACRIM Attacks". These measure the mean number of violent attacks carried out by each of these actors in each municipality between 1988-2010.[14] Electoral

[13]See Figure A1 in the Online Appendix for a map displaying the spatial distribution of the vote in the 2016 referendum.

[14]We are aware that the paramilitaries and the BACRIM are not the same. However, given the continuities between the two phenomena (see Section 3 and Granada, Restrepo and Tobón García 2009), we treat them together. Nevertheless, when differentiating between paramilitary and BACRIM violence, the results hold (Table A4 in the Online Appendix). We opted for the 1988–2010 timeframe for the core tests of our argument so that the results would be readily comparable with previous studies that have

data for the 2016 referendum comes from the Colombian National Civil Registry and data on violent events comes from the *Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario* – an agency of the Colombian Presidency.

To estimate the effect of exposure to violence on preferences over peace we rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, given the structure of our dependent variable, with departmental fixed effects to capture any unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we run several robustness checks, including a matching procedure and an instrumental variable estimation for exposure to FARC attacks (see Tables A3 to A14 in the Online Appendix).

In all our models, we include a set of relevant variables to control for different factors that could have had an impact on preferences over peace and/or on armed group actions. We divide these controls into three groups. First, we include variables related to past political behaviour and political preferences, which have been argued to be central in explaining both attitudes towards peace in Colombia (Liendo and Braithwaite 2018; Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015) and voting behaviour in Latin American referendums more generally (Breuer 2007; Durán-Martínez 2012). In particular, we control for the percentage of votes per municipality supporting Santos in the second round of the 2014 presidential elections[15] and referendum turnout.[16] In additional robustness models (see Tables A5-A6 in the Online Appendix), we control for the potential effect of long-standing ideological political preferences and attachments, including variables capturing the support for several political parties in four presidential elections: 1958, 1966, 1974 and 1986.

Second, we control for a set of socio-economic and demographic factors. We include measures of poverty[17] and "rurality" (i.e., the percentage of the population in the munic-

relied also on these data (e.g., Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015). However, as our argument rests on civilians' expectations of future victimization at the time of the referendum, stopping in 2010 might raise some concerns – even if major transformations in dynamics of violence had already taken place by 2010. As a robustness check we ran the models for the period 2010 – 2012 (also using a different source, the CNMH) and results widely support our expectations, with larger substantive effects but a decline in statistical significance (Table A14 in the Online Appendix). We do not go beyond 2012, as this is the year when the formal phase of the peace negotiation began and, as a consequence, the dynamics of FARC violence entered a whole new phase. This way, our time frame reduces concerns of potential endogeneity, as the measures on exposure to violence are all prior to the referendum.

[15]We focus on the second round because it more accurately captures the set of Santos' supporters. The inclusion of the first round does not alter the results (Table A11 in the Online Appendix). Source: Colombian National Civil Registry.

[16]Turnout in the referendum was fairly low (37,41%), especially when compared to prior elections.

[17]We measure poverty with the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Angulo et al. 2011).

ipality living in rural areas) since preliminary analysis of the referendum results indicated that both affected the vote, with residents of poorer (Fergusson and Molina 2016) and more rural (Arjona 2016b; Idler 2016) areas more strongly supporting the peace agreement. In addition, prior studies have found that high levels of population may increase the number of potential rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Therefore, we also include a variable capturing population.[18] Finally, we include a variable on education coverage (i.e., the percentage of matriculated students in primary and secondary education given the school-aged population) as a measure of economic isolation, a factor which has also been argued to shape conflict dynamics (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).[19]

And third, we included a set of variables on the availability of natural resources, as these have been argued to impact both conflict onset and municipal-level political preferences (Ross 2004). The key variable is the percentage of the municipal area with coca crops. Given that coca eradication and substitution was a central clause in the final peace agreement, the presence of coca crops could have played an important role in shaping citizens' preferences. Moreover, we use a dummy variable on oil availability and municipality elevation, which have been found to affect conflict onset and violent dynamics (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2006).[20]

6 Results and Discussion

This section is divided into three parts. We first present and discuss the results of the main OLS regression models we use to examine whether exposure to violence – both overall and from different armed groups – affected vote choice in the 2016 referendum. Second, we report and discuss a series of robustness checks for our results, including a matching procedure and an instrumental variables estimation for exposure to FARC violence. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence suggesting that the relationship we find in the quantitative analysis is indeed rooted in the logic of the theoretical argument outlined in Section 4.

[18]Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE).

[19]Figures might exceed the 100%, as people above schooling ages or students from other municipalities might be attending these schools. Source: Ministry of Education of Colombia.

[20]Data on oil comes from Daly (2012) and on elevation from the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table A1 in the Online Appendix.

6.1 Main Results

Our main models provide clear evidence that the identity of the perpetrator does matter when it comes to estimating the effect of exposure to violence on attitudes towards peace. While overall levels of violent attacks by all armed groups in each Colombian municipality does not have an impact on citizen's support for the peace agreement, clear (and statistically significant) effects emerge when we disaggregate by the identity of the perpetrator (see Figure 1).[21] This vindicates our claim on the importance of disaggregating "exposure to violence", since we could have easily rushed rushing into the conclusion that exposure to violence was not relevant in affecting preferences over the peace agreement if we would have looked at aggregated exposure.

Figure 1 - Exposure to Violence and Vote Choices in the referendum



Following our expectations, "who shot the bullets" seems to have played a key role in shaping the outcome of the 2016 referendum. As Table 1 reports, attacks by FARC ["(ln) FARC Attacks"] had a positive and significant effect ($p < 0.01$) on the vote for the Yes in the 2016 referendum. If the mean of FARC attacks in a given municipality increases by one percent, the vote for Yes in the referendum increases by approximately 1.06 points. By

[21] See Table A2 in the Online Appendix for full results. Table A3 reports robustness checks on the use of these two measures. Concretely, we use two variables from CERAC's conflict database on the strength and persistence of violence. None of these variables are statistically significant.

contrast, attacks by the paramilitaries and their successors ["(ln) paramilitary/BACRIM Attacks"] have a statistically significant ($p < 0.01$)negative effect on support for the peace agreement. If the mean of paramilitary/BACRIM attacks in a municipality increases by one percent, the vote for the Yes in the referendum decreases by approximately 1.32 points. After the inclusion of all relevant control variables, these effects hold with the same level of statistical significance.

Our results are consistent with claims made by several conflict scholars immediately after the shocking results of the referendum. Weintraub (reported in Meléndez 2016), for example, noted that communities that have been affected by FARC violence had a stronger tendency to vote Yes in the referendum. Similarly, but using a measure of armed group *presence* (rather than violence), Arjona (2016b) found that support for the agreement was 14% higher in communities with FARC presence than in communities with only paramilitary presence. Moreover, these results are also consistent with findings from other studies that have explored the differential effects of FARC versus paramilitary violence on Colombians' voting behavior more generally (Gallego 2018).[22]

The analysis also shows that other factors had an impact on the support towards the peace agreement. First, and in line with previous findings (Fergusson and Molina 2016; Liendo and Braithwaite 2018; Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015), municipalities with higher levels of support for Santos in the 2014 Presidential elections were more prone to vote Yes in the referendum ($p < 0.01$). This was to be expected, as both the 2014 elections and the 2016 referendum were marked by a strong cleavage over the peace process, with Santos as the "pro-peace" candidate. Second, as noted early on by Arjona (2016b), rural municipalities ($p < 0.01$) and municipalities with more coca cultivation ($p < 0.05$) were more prone to support the peace agreement. These two results were also to be expected, as concrete measures included in the final agreement aimed explicitly at improving the conditions of rural Colombia and involved a comprehensive strategy for crop substitution that could reduce the violent externalities of the coca trade. However, the substantive effect of exposure to violence from either armed group was significantly higher than the

[22]Moreover, and considering Pachenkina and Gamboa (2019), we test the potential impact of the interaction between exposure to counterinsurgent actions (proxied through government attacks) and FARC violence (Model 1 of Table A11 in the Online Appendix). Even though the interaction has a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) positive effect, the coefficients of both exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM attacks remain highly significant and in the expected direction.

Table 1 - OLS Identity Perpetrator

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
(ln) Attacks FARC	0.785***		1.835***	1.302***	1.100***	1.050***	1.058***
	(0.277)		(0.321)	(0.243)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.264)
(ln) Attacks Para/BACRIM		-1.166***	-2.151***	-2.400***	-1.608***	-1.470***	-1.322***
		(0.322)	(0.385)	(0.289)	(0.418)	(0.431)	(0.445)
% Partic. Referendum				-0.0903*	-0.0313	-0.0366	-0.0688
				(0.0466)	(0.0513)	(0.0535)	(0.0549)
% Support Santos 2014				0.586***	0.596***	0.589***	0.585***
				(0.0220)	(0.0217)	(0.0225)	(0.0245)
Poverty					0.000283	0.00289	-0.00801
					(0.0352)	(0.0363)	(0.0404)
(ln) Population					-0.0181	-0.126	-0.196
					(0.527)	(0.538)	(0.556)
Rural Index					0.0919***	0.0833***	0.0852***
					(0.0211)	(0.0218)	(0.0230)
Coca						2.022**	2.128**
						(1.028)	(1.039)
Oil						-1.627	-1.781*
						(1.036)	(1.047)
(ln) Elevation							0.113
							(0.358)
Education Coverage							0.0198
							(0.0191)
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	53.67***	60.89***	58.50***	27.87***	30.22**	20.01***	18.78*
	(12.49)	(12.47)	(12.30)	(9.299)	(12.04)	(7.414)	(9.602)
Observations	993	1028	945	944	927	887	857
R^2	0.478	0.463	0.481	0.711	0.720	0.710	0.699
Adjusted R^2	0.460	0.445	0.462	0.700	0.708	0.698	0.685

Dependent Variable: % Yes 2016 Referendum
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

impact of these other variables.[23]

Moreover, in additional model estimations (Table A11 in the Online Appendix), we included a series of additional control variables that speak to a series of potential alternative explanations. In dialogue with Pachenkina and Gamboa (2019), we included a measure of exposure to attacks from the government (and its interaction with FARC attacks) to explore the role of government counter-insurgency efforts. In addition, we included attacks from the ELN (the second largest guerrilla group active in the period of analysis), levels of land inequality, geographical characteristics (land area), and access to other natural resources (gemstones). Across all of these additional specifications, the main coefficients of interest (exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence) remain significant and in the expected direction.

In sum, our results show a clear trend: municipalities affected by FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM attacks had different preferences over the peace agreement. Those municipalities with higher levels of FARC-related violence were more prone to support the agreement, while those municipalities mostly exposed to paramilitary/BACRIM violence tended to vote No in the 2016 referendum.

6.2 Robustness Checks

Concerns over the reliability and robustness of the effects that we find might persist despite the supportive evidence provided so far. First, it could be reasonably argued that the asymmetric effects we observe emerge from existing group-biases driven by prevailing political ideological attachments (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013).[24] While in the original specifications (Models 4 – 7) we control for political preferences in the 2014 elections, we further address this concern by examining citizens' political preferences in four different presidential elections covering a period of almost thirty years – 1958, 1966, 1974 and 1986 – and across a wider variety of left-wing parties, including the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) and a coalition party that involved the FARC, the Patriotic Union (UP).[25]

[23] The only exception is coca cultivation.

[24] Given the nature of the Colombian conflict and the absence of clear ethnic cleavages, potential ethnic attachments are much less of a concern.

[25] Data comes from the Registraduría Nacional and the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE). A list of the main political parties in each election is presented in Table A5 in the Online Appendix.

When we take our last model (from Table 1) as a baseline and control for the level of support for left-wing political parties in each of these elections, results cast doubt on the potential impact of long-lasting political preferences on the support for the Yes in the 2016 referendum. None of the variables follow a common pattern and few of them are statistically significant (see Table A6 in the Online Appendix).[26] This provides us with additional confidence that our main findings are unlikely to be driven by the impact of this omitted variable.

Second, it could be argued that the location of FARC attacks is influenced by their expected electoral outcomes (Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015) or by other strategic considerations related to the negotiations of the peace agreement. In other words, our results might be affected by reverse causality. While we agree that this is a generally valid concern, we consider that it is slightly less relevant in our study given that our models only include measures of violence exposure that stop *before* the beginning of the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, to deal with these concerns more directly, we follow a matching procedure and employed an instrumental variable estimation for FARC attacks.[27]

Matching allowed us to compare pairs of municipalities that are similar in the set of covariates found significant in our main estimations, but that differ in their levels of exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence.[28] The results of the matching tests are consistent with our main models: coefficients remain in the expected direction and retain statistical significance in most of the model specifications (see Tables A7 to A9 in the Online Appendix). The effect of FARC violence remains positive, with a coefficient ranging between 0.67-0.82 ($p < 0.05$), similar to the OLS estimates. Paramilitary/BACRIM violence keeps its expected negative coefficients, but achieves a lower level of significance ($p < 0.05$ - $p < 0.1$) and the estimated effects are not as similar to the ones yielded by the OLS models (they range between -0.44 and -0.8).[29]

As for the instrumental variable estimation (Table A10 of the Appendix), we instru-

[26]Evidence presented in this table goes firmly against the argument that support for the Yes in the referendum might have been driven by long-time political preferences towards the FARC. Vote for UP in the 1986 elections – a party founded by the FARC and the CCP as part of the peace negotiations held in the mid-80's – lacks any statistical significance.

[27]Regrettably, a convincing IV could not be found for paramilitary/BACRIM violence.

[28]We make use of dose-response functions, which facilitate the creation of treatment and comparison groups based on continuous variables (see Bia and Mattei 2008). We create two different treatments, one for each type of exposure to armed violence.

[29]When including FARC violence as one of the covariates, the coefficient loses significance (Model 5 – Table A9). Nevertheless, it recovers it when we use a dummy variable on exposure to FARC violence (Model 6 – Table A9).

mented exposure to FARC attacks by distance of each municipality to its departmental capital. The underlying logic of this instrument is that while it is reasonable to expect that the government has more difficulties reaching more distant places, and therefore these areas might be more prone to FARC actions, this should not have a direct effect on the support for the peace agreement other than through the impact of exposure to FARC attacks – especially when controlling for the set of variables included in the main models. The first stage regressions (Table A10) show that the distance of each municipality to its departmental capital is indeed positively and highly correlated with the frequency of FARC attacks and the results of the second stage show that the instrument remains positive and significant ($p < 0.05$).

In sum, these different analyses and robustness checks provide added confidence that exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence had asymmetric effects on people's support for the peace agreement in the directions predicted by our theoretical argument.

6.3 What About the Internal Logic of the Argument?

While the results reported so far strongly support the theoretical expectations proposed in Section 4, the evidence does not speak directly to the logic underlying the expected effects according to our theoretical argument. Did citizens living in municipalities mostly affected by FARC violence support the peace agreement because they thought that peace would improve their security conditions? Did those who had been mostly exposed to paramilitary/BACRIM violence expressed less support for the agreement because they feared paramilitary retribution? Providing systematic evidence for this is a (important) task we leave for future research. However, here we offer qualitative evidence from different regions of Colombia that support to the logic outlined in the argument.[30]

We first adduce evidence from the El Catatumbo region in the north-east of the country. Historically abandoned by the Colombian state, El Catatumbo has experienced continuous guerrilla group presence since the 1970s. The FARC arrived in the territory in the mid-1980s and since then has fought for territorial control mostly with other non-

[30]Qualitative evidence comes from grounded knowledge of the local and regional dynamics of the Colombian conflict, as well as testimonies collected in the field in 2014, 2015 and 2019. The 2019 field visit was supported by CONPEACE, a research programme on transitions from war to peace based at the University of Oxford and led by Annette Idler. For more information https://conpeace.ccw.ox.ac.uk/.

state armed groups and engaged in numerous violent attacks. In fact, in seven out of the ten municipalities comprising the region, our measure of FARC violence is well above the mean. In line with our quantitative findings, support for the peace agreement in the region was also very high. Especially in those municipalities that had been most exposed to FARC violence (e.g., Teorama, Hacarí, El Tarra and San Calixto), levels of support were over 85%.[31]

In early 2019 we had the chance to visit El Catatumbo and ask residents about their attitudes towards the peace agreement. Almost every single person we spoke to reported having voted Yes in the referendum. When asked why, some noted that they saw the agreement as an opportunity to pacify, and therefore develop, the region. One resident of Teorama explicitly noted that she saw the agreement as a chance to finally live in her village without the fear of FARC victimizing them or dictating to them what to do.[32] A social leader from El Tarra noted that during the various ceasefires that FARC unilaterally declared during the negotiations and the bilateral ceasefire both sides agreed towards the end of the process, his community observed an important de-escalation of violence and this convinced them to support the peace agreement. In his words, "This [the decline of violence due to the ceasefires] showed us that we had no other option than going for the Yes."[33] In fact, support for the peace agreement in El Tarra was 91.5%. In general, most people in El Catatumbo saw the agreement as something that would not only benefit the FARC but also improve their living standards (Álvares Vanegas and Garzón 2016).

This was not the case, however, in the entire region. Some residents noted that things were different in Ocaña, a more urban municipality where the paramilitaries where particularly ruthless in the late 1990s and early 2000s and where, according to the official Registry of Victims (RUV), a large number of paramilitary victims live. One social leader explicitly noted that after the demobilization of the AUC, Ocaña became a "center of operations" of different BACRIMs, which allowed them to influence the vote in the

[31]Tibú, a core urban center in El Catatumbo, constitutes a partial exception.

[32]Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia. To protect the identity of respondents, we neither provide proper names, nor the specific villages where the testimonies were collected.

[33]Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia. According to data collected by CERAC (2017), FARC's military activity indeed dropped by up to 98% during these ceasefires. However, evidence also shows that FARC's ceasefires had unintended negative consequences on the security of social leaders (Prem et al. 2018).

referendum via threats and extortions – an underexplored expression of paramilitarism acting as a spoiler of peace (Maher and Thomson 2018).[34] Here, support for the agreement was minimal: only 30% voted Yes. These accounts are largely consistent with the internal logic of our argument.

Our argument also holds in places where the FARC are infamous for having committed some of the most brutal acts of violence in the group's history. This is the case, for example, in the afro-Colombian town of Bojayá in the Department of Chocó in the Pacific coast. In Boyajá, against all odds (but in line with our argument), residents overwhelmingly supported the peace agreement: 95.7% of the population voted Yes in the 2016 referendum. Explaining the community's vote choice, one resident noted: "We had all the reasons to vote No. But we have suffered [from FARC's violence] more than anyone else. We saw in the ballots the possibility to put an end to 52 years of conflict".[35] As in various municipalities of El Catatumbo, residents that had been highly affected by FARC violence in the past saw in the agreement an opportunity to improve their security conditions.

The story in the municipality of Apartadó, where we have also conducted field research, is quite different. In this area, in north-western Colombia, the AUC successfully managed to rip control away from the FARC back in the mid-1990s and deeply terrorized the population by selectively killing leaders and collectively targeting residents (see, Masullo 2017, Chap. 5; Steele 2017, Chap. 6). Since their demobilization in 2005, the Gaitanista Self-defense Forces (AGC) have increasingly taken control of the area.[36] While the government considers the AGC a "criminal band", the population largely see them as "the same old paramilitaries".[37] The AGC has caused the most harm to the civilian population in the last decade, engaging in extortions, forced displacement, death threats and selective killings. Unlike El Tarra or Bojayá, but in line with our argument, support for the agreement in Apartadó was only slightly over 50%.

Levels of violence from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries have historically been high in Apartadó. However, in the years leading up to the 2016 referendum, residents have

[34] Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia.

[35] "Creímos en el perdón de las FARC y se lo concedimos en las urnas". Revista Semana. 10/04/2016. Available at https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bojaya-plebiscito-por-la-paz-devolvio-la-desesperanza/497771 [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

[36] The group was formally known as Los Urabeños and later as the Clan Úsuga. Today they are also known as the Clan del Golfo.

[37] Field Notes, August 2015. Urabá, Colombia.

been mostly concerned with paramilitary violence. When asked about their takes on the then-ongoing peace agreement in 2015, inhabitants of the village of San José told us that while they hoped the government could achieve peace with FARC, they were seriously concerned about what could happen in the aftermath of the agreement. "Real peace will only come to Apartadó if peace is negotiated with all armed groups, including the paramilitaries, not only with FARC", stressed a member of a "peace community" located in the rural village of San José de Apartadó.[38] Similarly, a leader of a peasant association from the same village noted: "There are some actors sitting [at the negotiation table] and we have seen an improvement [of security conditions] in the territory. We don't see that intimidation, the bombs, the combats; but we want those actors that aren't taking part in the negotiations to take part, so we can feel a form of peace in which peasants don't see weapons in our lands anymore."[39]

In line with the logic outlined in our argument, villagers of Apartadó feared retaliation from the AGC if they supported the peace agreement and this fear grew stronger as a potential agreement with FARC became more plausible. During the referendum campaign, peasants associations from the area constantly reported to the government and international agencies the increased presence of members of the AGC in their territories and noted that the paramilitaries were coercing them into rejecting the peace agreement.[40] Residents of Apartadó had already experienced brutal paramilitary violence in the past for voting for a left-wing political party linked to the FARC, the UP (Steele 2011, 2017, Chap. 6). Despite being generally supportive of the peace agreement, they feared suffering the same fate with the 2016 referendum. As a consequence, to avoid credible violent retribution, many did not express their private preferences regarding the agreement at the ballots and voted against the agreement.

[38]Field Notes, August 2015. Urabá, Colombia.

[39]Peasant leader cited in "En San José de Apartadó exigen verificar presencia paramilitar" Verdad Abierta. 08/11/2016. Available: https://verdadabierta.com/en-san-jose-de-apartado-exigen-verificar-presencia-paramilitar/ [Last accessed: August 13, 2019]. These testimonies suggest a complementary interpretation of our results that is largely consistent with the internal logic of our argument but not explicitly captured by it: people living in areas affected by paramilitary/BACRIM violence might have had incentives not vote No because the peace process was framed as "ending the conflict" and for them the conflict was not going to end. They not only expected no change in violence, but also worried/feared that the idea of "ending the war" would push authorities to forget about them and the violence they suffer. We thank Elena Butti for calling out attention to this.

[40]Field Notes, August 2015. See also "San José de Apartadó: ¿asediado por los 'Gaitanistas'?" Verdad Abierta. 15/02/2016 Available: https://verdadabierta.com/san-jose-de-apartado-asediado-por-los-gaitanistas/ [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

7 Conclusion

This paper has analyzed how exposure to violence affects attitudes towards peace in the context of the Colombian 2016 referendum. It finds that the identity of the perpetrator matters. Concretely, as formulated by our theoretical argument, while municipalities mostly affected by FARC violence were more prone to support the peace agreement, those mostly affected by paramilitary/BACRIM attacks were more prone to vote against the agreement. We argue that the driving force behind these asymmetrical effects are safety-seeking considerations. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the shocking outcome of the Colombian referendum and the underlying conditions that shape support for peace in the country – something that remains important today for the successful implementation of the agreement. In addition, it makes a theoretical and methodological contribution to the growing literature on the effects of wartime violence on peoples' preferences and behaviors, revealing the benefits of disaggregating "exposure to violence" and looking at "who shot the bullets".

Despite the strongly supportive quantitative and qualitative evidence offered, our study has certain limitations that should be acknowledged. First, we focused on violence alone, when we know that civilian attitudes and choices, that could definitely affect support for peace, can also be shaped by non-violent combatant–civilian interactions that are a central part of irregular civil wars, such as rebel governance (Mampilly 2011; Arjona 2016a, 2016b). Second, our examination focused on the municipality, with violence and voting behavior data aggregated at this level of analysis. Some important variation in the way local communities experience violence (and other wartime dynamics), which could have had an impact on their vote choice in the referendum, is likely to get lost at this level of aggregation. Moreover, while there is evidence suggesting that direct (self-reported) and indirect (contextual) victimization can have differential effects on civilian preferences (Masullo and Morisi 2019), our focus on the municipality does not allow us to tap into this difference. All in all, as much as we would have liked to explore these other non-violent dynamics and disaggregated beyond the municipality, here we were limited by data availability.

Finally, as with most data on wartime violence, there is room for reporting bias in the datasets we relied on to measure our independent variables. Systematic sub/over-reporting of attacks by different factions included in our analysis would directly affect our

results. Nevertheless, when compared to other datasets compiling violent events in the Colombian conflict, the *Observatorio* data has been found to suffer less from this type of bias (Albertus and Kaplan 2013).

While referendums to ratify peace agreement are not a common occurrence, the co-existence of elections and ongoing civil war is much more recurrent. While there is ample evidence that armed actors are often involved in electoral politics (e.g., Matanock and Staniland 2018; Staniland 2015), our study shows that when both phenomena coexist, citizens have the opportunity to boost or freeze peace efforts by voting in favor or against pro-peace candidates. Beyond this having a direct impact on war trajectories, this realization can also have important implications for citizens' security. As our theory suggests, asking civilians to participate in public, political decisions in an unstable environment such that of internal armed conflict can put people at grave risk of suffering violent retribution by armed actors (Steele 2017; Steele and Schubiger 2018). In the absence of strong and effective protection measures, civilians will have incentives to falsify their private political preferences at the ballot box and/or to not participate in democratic processes at all, posing an obstacle to peace and ultimately undermining democratic institutions.

Bibliography

Albertus, Michael, and Oliver Kaplan. 2013. Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(2): 198-231.

Álvares Vanegas, Eduardo, and Juan Carlos Garzón. 2016. *El país que desveló la ventaja del No.* Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP). [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Angulo, Roberto, Yadira Díaz, Renata Pardo, and Yolanda Riveros. 2011. Índice de pobreza multidimensional para Colombia. *Working Paper*, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Dirección de Estudios Económicos, Archivos de Economía.

Arjona, Ana. 2016a. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2016b. War Dynamics and the "NO" Vote in the Colombian Referendum. *Political Violence at a Glance.* http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/10/20/war-dynamics-and-the-no-vote-in-the-colombian-referendum/ [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Bakke, Kristin M., John O'Loughlin, and Michael D. Ward. 2009. Reconciliation in Conflict-Affected Societies: Multilevel Modeling of Individual and Contextual Factors in the North Caucasus of Russia. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99(5): 1012-21.

Balcells, Laia. 2017. *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bauer, Michal et al. 2016. Can War Foster Cooperation? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30(3): 249-74.

Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2009. War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. *Journal of Public Economics* 93(11–12): 1144-57.

Bia, Michela, and Alessandra Mattei. 2008. A Stata package for the estimation of the dose–response function through adjustment for the generalized propensity score. *Stata Journal* 8(3): 354-73.

Breuer, Anita. 2007. Institutions of Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America's Presidential Democracies. *Democratization* 14(4): 554-79.

Brodzinsky, Sibylla. 2016. Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Peace Deal with Farc Guerrillas. *The Guardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Canetti, Daphna, Brian J. Hall, Carmit Rapaport, and Carly Wayne. 2013. Exposure to political violence and political extremism: A stress-based process. *European Psychologist* 18(4): 263-72.

CERAC. 2017. Monitor del Cese el Fuego Bialteral y de Hostilidades - Reporte Final. *CERAC — Opinión y Análisis.* https://www.blog.cerac.org.co/monitor-del-cese-el-fuego-bilateral-y-de-hostilidades-final [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

CNMH. 2013. *¡Basta Ya! Colombia: memorias de guerra y dignidad.* Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-95.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2012 Organizational legacies of violence: Conditions favoring insurgency onset in Colombia, 1964–1984. *Journal of Peace Research* 49.(3): 473-491.

Durán-Martínez, Angélica. 2012. Presidents, Parties, and Referenda in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 45(9): 1159-87.

Dyrstad, Karin et al. 2011. Microfoundations of Civil Conflict Reconciliation: Ethnicity and Context. *International Interactions* 37(4): 363-87.

El País (2016). "El voto evangélico, clave en la victoria del NO en el plebiscito de Colombia". *El Pais* https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/10/12/colombia/1476237985-601462.html [Last accessed: August 13, 2019]

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(01): 75-90.

Fergusson, Leopoldo, and Carlos Molina. 2016. Un vistazo a los resultados del plebiscito. *Miscelánea La Paz.* https://sites.google.com/site/miscelaneadelapaz/datos [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Flores, Thomas E, and Juan F Vargas. 2018. Colombia: Democracy, Violence, and the Peacebuilding Challenge. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(6): 581-86.

Franke, Jörg, and Tahir Öztürk. 2015. Conflict networks. *Journal of Public Economics* 126(C): 104-13.

Gallego, Jorge. 2018. Civil Conflict and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(6): 601-21.

Gonzáles Posso, Camilo. 2014. Negotiations with the FARC: 1982 - 2002. *Accord (14).* https://www.c-r.org/accord-article/negotiations-farc-1982-2002 [Last accessed: August

13, 2019].

Granada, Soledad, Jorge Restrepo, and Alonso Tobón García. 2009. Neoparamilitarismo en Colombia: una herramienta conceptual para la interpretación de dinámicas recientes del conflicto armado colombiano. En *Guerra y violencias en Colombia: herramientas e interpretaciones*, eds. David Aponte y Jorge Restrepo. Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 467-500.

Hayes, Bernadette C, and Ian McAllister. 2001. Who voted for peace? Public support for the 1998 Northern Ireland agreement. *Irish Political Studies* 16(1): 73-93.

Hirsch-Hoefler, Sivan, Daphna Canetti, Carmit Rapaport, and Stevan E. Hobfoll. 2016. Conflict Will Harden Your Heart: Exposure to Violence, Psychological Distress, and Peace Barriers in Israel and Palestine. *British Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 845-59.

Idler, Annette. 2016. Colombia just voted no on its plebiscite for peace. Here's why and what it means. *Monkey Cage, Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/colombia-just-voted-no-on-its-referendum-for-peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/?utm-term=.917f3260fd24. [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaplan, Oliver. 2017. *Resist War. How Communities Protect Themselves.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krakowski, Krzysztof. 2019. Pulled Together or Torn Asunder? Community Cohesion After Symmetric and Asymmetric Civil War. *EPSA 2019.*

Liendo, Nicolás, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2018. Determinants of Colombian Attitudes toward the Peace Process. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(6): 622-36.

Lupu, Yonatan, and Geoffrey Wallace. 2019. Targeting and Public Opinion: An Experimental Analysis in Ukraine. At *CESS Nuffield Seminar, Oxford.*

Lyall, Jason. 2010. Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War. *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 1-20.

Lyall, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. 2013. Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan. *American Political Science Review* 107(04): 679-705.

Masullo, Juan. 2015. *The Power of Staying Put: Nonviolent Resistance Against Armed Groups in Colombia.* International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

———. 2017. A Theory of Civilian Noncooperation with Armed Groups. Civilian Agency and Self-protection in the Colombian Civil War. *Doctoral Dissertation.* European University Institute.

Masullo, Juan, and Davide Morisi. 2019a. Risks and Opportunities of Direct Democracy: The Effect of Information in Colombia's Peace Referendum. *Politics and Governance* 7(2): 242.

———. 2019b. The Human Costs of the War on Drugs. Attitudes towards Militarization of Security in Mexico. *ISPP Annual Meeting*, Lisbon, Portugal.

Matanock, Aila M, and Natalia Garbiras-Díaz. 2018. Considering Concessions: A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(6): 637-55.

Matanock, Aila M., and Miguel García-Sánchez. 2017. The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions Popular Plebiscites. *Daedalus* 146(4): 152-66.

Mckeon, Celia. 2005. Civil society: Participating in peace processes. In *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society.*, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, y Juliette Verhoeven. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Meléndez, Marcela. 2016. ¿Qué pasó, Colombia? *Foco Económico.*

Morelo, Daniel. 2016. Así es el país que votó No. *La Silla Vacía — Silla Nacional.* https://lasillavacia.com/hagame-el-cruce/asi-es-el-pais-que-voto-no-58201 [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

Nasi, Carlo. 2009. Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. In *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*, ed. Virginia Marie Bouvier. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 39–64.

Nasi, Carlo, and Angelika Rettberg. 2019. Colombia's Farewell to Civil War. In *How Negotiations End. Negotiating Behavior in the Endgame*, ed. William Zartman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Newman, Saul. 2012. Between Optimism and Pessimism: Israeli Attitudes Toward Conflict Resolution in the Post-Oslo Era. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 18(4): 476-504.

Nilsson, Desirée. 2012. Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace. *International Interactions* 38(2): 243-66.

Osorio, Javier. 2016. Support for Torture. Experimental Evidence from the Mexican War on Drugs. *Working Paper* New York.

Prem, Mounu, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario A. Romero, and Juan F. Vargas,. 2018. Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace. *Working Paper*

Restrepo, Jorge, Micheal Spagat, and Juan Vargas. 2004. The Dynamics of the Colombian Conflict: A New Data Set. *Homo Oeconomicus* 21(2): 396-428.

Romero, Mauricio. 2003. *Paramilitares y Autodefensas, 1982-2003.* Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales.

Ross, Michael. 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9(1): 265-300.

———. 2004. What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337-56.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov. 2017. The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-Term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine. *The Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1147-61.

Steele, Abbey. 2009. Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(3): 419-29.

———. 2011. Electing Displacement: Political Cleansing in Apartadó, Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3): 423-45.

———. 2017. *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Steele, Abbey, and Livia I Schubiger. 2018. Democracy and Civil War: The Case of Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(6): 587-600.

Tellez, Juan Fernando. 2019a. Peace Agreement Design and Public Support for Peace: Evidence from Colombia. *Journal of Peace Research*: 0022343319853603.

———. 2019b. Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(4): 1053-76.

Visconti, Giancarlo. 2019. Policy Preferences after Crime Victimization: Panel and Survey Evidence from Latin America. *British Journal of Political Science*: 1-15.

Weintraub, Michael, Juan F Vargas, and Thomas E. Flores. 2015. Vote Choice and Legacies of Violence: Evidence from the 2014 Colombian Presidential Elections. *Research*

& Politics 2(2): 205316801557334.

Appendix

Tables

Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
% Yes Referendum	1,117	52.60077	17.14791	10.43	100
(ln) FARC Attacks	996	-.1680068	1.671468	-3.135494	4.103721
(ln) Para/BACRIM. Attacks	1,031	-.537638	1.409221	-3.135494	5.095874
% Partic. Referendum	1,117	35.28815	8.332283	3.38	62.41
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	1,117	46.59715	20.65418	5.959836	95.65218
Poverty Index	1,065	68.65382	16.07918	14.27179	100
(ln) Population	1,095	9.532494	1.059444	6.682772	15.65469
Rural Index	1,094	58.08148	23.65175	.1851246	100
Coca	1,093	.0005863	.0047209	0	.1187151
Oil	1,009	.1179386	.3226953	0	1
(ln) Elevation	1,009	6.411968	1.665436	.6931472	8.101678
Education Coverage	1,058	97.29155	18.55754	0	233.828
(ln) Exposure Total	1,121	-.1449498	1.478192	-3.135494	4.69334
(ln) Exposure Total per 1000	1,065	-2.721112	1.104303	-7.009632	.9948266
CERAC Strong	1,121	.0802855	.2718559	0	1
CERAC Persistent	1,121	.0392507	.1942774	0	1
(ln) Attacks Government	933	-.4517119	1.453971	-3.135494	5.119295
(ln) ELN Attacks	707	-.9624348	1.621237	-3.135494	3.576246
% Santos 1st Round 2014	1,112	34.19157	18.98958	0	100
Land Inequality	953	.684857	.1118914	0	.981579
(ln) Area	1,063	10.38035	1.221364	7.313221	15.69763
Nat. Res. Royalties pc	1,095	.0248051	.1393667	0	2.904564
Gems	1,048	.0486641	.2152676	0	1
% Liberals 1958	832	66.7772	38.45945	0	100
% Liberals 1966	907	73.45768	23.52121	0	100
% Liberals 1974	951	50.8346	28.93294	0	99.87091
% Liberals 1986	995	51.48282	25.89293	.1655081	99.10847
% ANAPO 1966	907	24.11137	22.24633	0	100
% ANAPO 1974	951	7.551252	8.703659	0	61.75337
% UNO 1974	951	1.638465	4.693081	0	63.55685
% Unión Patriótica 1986	995	5.02046	11.35802	0	95.83778
% Communist Party 1986	995	.3552041	1.443927	0 38.84892	
% Duque 2nd Round 2018	1,121	63.82857	20.67748	4.694933	97.02352
(ln) FARC Attacks 2010-2012	1,121	.0356494	.1531994	-3.135494	1.714798
(ln) PARA/Bacrim Attacks 2010-2012	1,121	.0693136	.267415	-3.135494	4.043051
(ln) Distance Dept. Capital	1,009	4.58563	.8217077	1.609438	6.672033

Table A2 - OLS Exposure to Total Violence

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) Exposure Total	-0.267	
	(0.345)	
(ln) Exposure Total 1000 Pop.		-0.229
		(0.344)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0518	-0.0524
	(0.0517)	(0.0516)
% Support Santos 2014	0.584***	0.584***
	(0.0231)	(0.0231)
Poverty	0.0281	0.0273
	(0.0367)	(0.0367)
(ln) Population	-0.708	-0.974**
	(0.485)	(0.393)
Rural Index	0.0863***	0.0866***
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)
Coca	2.486**	2.484**
	(1.024)	(1.024)
Oil	-1.741*	-1.748*
	(0.993)	(0.993)
(ln) Elevation	0.250	0.250
	(0.338)	(0.338)
Education Coverage	0.0197	0.0197
	(0.0180)	(0.0180)
Department FE	✓	✓
Constant	22.67***	24.61***
	(8.205)	(7.610)
Observations	967	967
R^2	0.689	0.689
Adjusted R^2	0.678	0.678

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3 – OLS Exposure to Total Violence (Robustness)

	Model (1)
CERAC Strong	1.198
	(1.449)
CERAC Persistent	2.561
	(1.972)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0563
	(0.0516)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.581***
	(0.0230)
Poverty Index	0.0185
	(0.0361)
(ln) Population	-1.249***
	(0.412)
Rural Index	0.0880***
	(0.0216)
Coca	2.287**
	(1.032)
Oil	-1.990**
	(0.993)
(ln) Elevation	0.228
	(0.337)
Education Coverage	0.0165
	(0.0178)
Department FE	✓
Constant	26.60***
	(7.620)
Observations	967
R^2	0.691
Adjusted R^2	0.679

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4 – OLS Exposure to Paramilitaries/BACRIM

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) FARC Attacks	1.142***	0.978***
	(0.264)	(0.264)
(ln) Para Attacks	-1.600***	
	(0.427)	
(ln) BACRIM Attacks		-1.133***
		(0.438)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0686	-0.0722
	(0.0547)	(0.0553)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.584***	0.580***
	(0.0244)	(0.0247)
Poverty Index	-0.00537	-0.0116
	(0.0402)	(0.0407)
(ln) Population	0.0136	-0.170
	(0.549)	(0.563)
Rural Index	0.0833***	0.0884***
	(0.0229)	(0.0230)
Coca	2.176**	2.076**
	(1.036)	(1.041)
Oil	-1.645	-1.823*
	(1.045)	(1.058)
(ln) Elevation	0.116	0.202
	(0.357)	(0.366)
Education Coverage	0.0210	0.0239
	(0.0191)	(0.0192)
Department FE	✓	✓
Constant	16.51*	18.15*
	(9.579)	(9.646)
Observations	857	841
R^2	0.701	0.695
Adjusted R^2	0.687	0.682

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5 – Political Parties Presidential Elections

	Ideology	1958	1966	1974	1986
ANAPO	Left				
Communist Party	Left				
Unión Patriótica	Left				
UNO	Left				
Liberals	Center-Left				
Christian Socio-Democrat	Center				
Conservatives	Center-Right				
Others	Various				

Source: *Registraduría Nacional* and CEDE.

Table A6 – Endogeneity Politics

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)	Model (9)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.914***	1.009***	1.008***	1.052***	1.039***	1.065***	1.004***	0.965***	0.991***
	(0.284)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.263)	(0.270)	(0.263)
ln_atparabacrim_cede	-1.179**	-1.108**	-1.122**	-1.272***	-1.199***	-1.239***	-1.436***	-1.417***	-1.407***
	(0.497)	(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.462)	(0.464)	(0.463)	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.447)
% Liberals 1958	0.00885								
	(0.00973)								
% Liberals 1966		0.0432***							
		(0.0157)							
% ANAPO 1966			-0.0490***						
			(0.0169)						
% Liberals 1974				0.0168					
				(0.0129)					
% ANAPO 1974					-0.0486				
					(0.0423)				
% UNO 1974						-0.0216			
						(0.0709)			
% Liberals 1986							0.0192		
							(0.0138)		
% UP 1986								0.0160	
								(0.0369)	
% Communist Party 1986									0.0299
									(0.237)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	26.52**	27.92**	32.03***	25.78**	28.09**	26.78**	17.69	18.99	19.06
	(12.37)	(12.15)	(12.19)	(12.02)	(12.05)	(12.01)	(11.79)	(11.77)	(11.77)
Observations	697	755	755	789	789	789	824	824	824
R^2	0.698	0.698	0.699	0.711	0.710	0.710	0.707	0.707	0.707
Adjusted R^2	0.681	0.683	0.683	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.694	0.693	0.693

Table A7 – Main Matching Model

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.684**	
	(0.343)	
(ln) Paramilitary/BACRIM Attacks		-0.770**
		(0.389)
Constant	54.196***	55.732***
	(1.598)	(1.552)
Observations	802	836
R^2	0.0086	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.0061	0.0012

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8 – Matching Continuous Treatment FARC

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.721**	0.674**	0.714**	0 .671*	0.820**	0.676**
	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.347)	(0.350)	(0.343)
Constant	55.435***	52.755***	54.745***	50.414***	54.796***	53.507***
	(1.568)	(1.561)	(1.574)	(1.566)	(1.567)	(1.568)
Observations	798	802	802	771	769	802
R^2	0.014	0.005	0.010	0.005	0.012	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.003	0.008	0.003	0.009	0.004

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Model 1: Variables of Table 2 as well as Santos 1st Round 2014.
2: Variables of Table 2 as well as Attacks by ELN.
3: Variables of Table 2 as well as other socio-demographic and natural resources variables (Gems and Population).
4: Variables of Table 2 as well as variables on geographic conditions and state capacity (Area; Elevation; Education).
5: Variables of Table 2 as well as paramilitary/BACRIM violence.
6: Variables of Table 2 as well as dummy on paramilitary/BACRIM violence.

Table A9 – Matching Continuous Treatment Paramilitary/BACRIM

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
(ln) Paramilitary/BACRIM Attacks	-0.692*	-0.680*	-0.666*	-0.651*	-0.448	-0.793**
	(0.389)	(0.392)	(0.390)	(0.390)	(0.420)	(0.390)
Constant	56.243***	54.159***	55.573***	54.194***	53.873***	55.056***
	(1.544)	(1.583)	(1.566)	(1.542)	(1.666)	(1.551)
Observations	832	836	836	800	769	836
R^2	0.017	0.008	0.014	0.015	0.005	0.012
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.006	0.011	0.012	0.003	0.009

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Model 1: Variables of Table 2 as well as Santos 1st Round 2014.

2: Variables of Table 2 as well as Attacks by ELN.

3: Variables of Table 2 as well as other socio-demographic and natural resources variables (Gems and Population).

4: Variables of Table 2 as well as variables on geographic conditions and state capacity (Area; Elevation; Education).

5: Variables of Table 2 as well as FARC violence.

6: Variables of Table 2 as well as dummy on FARC violence.

Table A10 – Instrumental Variable Analysis

	First Stage	Second Stage	First Stage	Second Stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(ln) Distance Departmental Capital	0.289***		0.213***	
	(0.059)		(0.061)	
(ln) FARC Attacks		10.343***		5.420**
		(2.838)		(2.451)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks			0.614***	-4.103**
			(0.056)	(1.610)
Rest of Controls				
Department Fixed Effects				
Observations	915	915	826	826
R^2	0.291	.	0.493	0.599

Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11 – Robustness Controls

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
(ln) FARC Attacks	1.069***	1.102***	1.197***	1.033***	1.196***	1.050***	1.058***
	(0.312)	(0.357)	(0.258)	(0.261)	(0.283)	(0.263)	(0.264)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	-1.412***	-1.595***	-1.502***	-1.553***	-1.322***	-1.312***	-1.323***
	(0.484)	(0.592)	(0.435)	(0.427)	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.446)
(ln) Attacks Gvt.	-11.02**						
	(5.117)						
(ln) Attacks Gvt.* FARC	4.606**						
	(1.873)						
(ln) Attacks ELN		-0.224					
		(0.350)					
% Santos 1st Round 2014			0.276***				
			(0.0397)				
Land Inequality				-10.73***			
				(3.404)			
(ln) Area					-0.657		
					(0.491)		
Nat. Res. Royalt. pc						-4.357*	
						(2.342)	
Gems							0.0960
							(1.487)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	11.35	-0.535	9.693	31.68***	24.92***	19.27**	18.80*
	(9.447)	(13.04)	(9.441)	(8.728)	(9.453)	(9.591)	(9.612)
Observations	791	600	853	740	856	857	857
R^2	0.704	0.684	0.714	0.758	0.699	0.700	0.699
Adjusted R^2	0.689	0.663	0.701	0.746	0.686	0.686	0.685

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12 – Sensitivity Analysis

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)	Model (9)	Model (10)	Model (11)
(ln) FARC Attacks		0.624***	1.051***	1.679***	1.044***	1.050***	1.070***	1.087***	1.056***	1.095***	1.016***
		(0.240)	(0.264)	(0.342)	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.266)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.258)	(0.259)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	-0.710*		-1.296***	-1.739***	-1.320***	-1.412***	-1.532***	-1.311***	-1.455***	-1.455***	-1.341***
	(0.388)		(0.445)	(0.579)	(0.445)	(0.364)	(0.445)	(0.446)	(0.440)	(0.434)	(0.443)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0642	-0.0525		-0.0174	-0.0654	-0.0675	-0.0756	-0.0691	-0.0611	-0.0546	-0.0488
	(0.0533)	(0.0542)		(0.0714)	(0.0522)	(0.0548)	(0.0553)	(0.0550)	(0.0543)	(0.0542)	(0.0542)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.582***	0.593***	0.584***		0.585***	0.585***	0.582***	0.590***	0.583***	0.585***	0.590***
	(0.0238)	(0.0240)	(0.0245)		(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0247)	(0.0244)	(0.0244)	(0.0227)	(0.0243)
Poverty Index	0.0289	0.00641	0.00777	-0.0492		-0.00429	0.0734**	-0.00389	-0.00571	-0.000172	-0.00579
	(0.0374)	(0.0395)	(0.0384)	(0.0525)		(0.0389)	(0.0341)	(0.0404)	(0.0399)	(0.0367)	(0.0393)
(ln) Population	-0.330	-0.929**	-0.149	-0.265	-0.167		-0.481	-0.154	-0.154	-0.0828	-0.244
	(0.527)	(0.445)	(0.555)	(0.723)	(0.536)		(0.555)	(0.557)	(0.552)	(0.544)	(0.550)
Rural Index	0.0779***	0.0978***	0.0862***	0.0669**	0.0827***	0.0863***		0.0867***	0.0838***	0.0844***	0.0840***
	(0.0222)	(0.0227)	(0.0230)	(0.0299)	(0.0193)	(0.0228)		(0.0230)	(0.0229)	(0.0220)	(0.0228)
Coca	2.428**	2.183**	2.131**	4.541***	2.117**	2.114**	2.251**		1.915*	2.095**	2.039**
	(1.043)	(1.028)	(1.040)	(1.346)	(1.037)	(1.038)	(1.047)		(1.029)	(1.032)	(1.035)
Oil	-1.659	-1.919*	-1.733*	-0.0114	-1.786*	-1.775*	-1.802*	-1.510		-1.702	-1.700
	(1.026)	(1.025)	(1.047)	(1.360)	(1.046)	(1.047)	(1.055)	(1.041)		(1.045)	(1.039)
(ln) Elevation	0.254	0.278	0.0841	-2.603***	0.141	0.126	0.419	0.0802	0.161		0.0929
	(0.343)	(0.354)	(0.358)	(0.442)	(0.331)	(0.356)	(0.352)	(0.359)	(0.355)		(0.345)
Education Coverage	0.0202	0.0207	0.0189	0.00460	0.0204	0.0206	0.0176	0.0172	0.0187	0.0158	
	(0.0186)	(0.0187)	(0.0191)	(0.0249)	(0.0189)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)	(0.0191)	(0.0190)	(0.0184)	
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	17.99**	27.56**	14.94	71.25***	19.24***	16.32**	18.25*	19.53**	23.58**	19.19**	25.49**
	(9.095)	(11.62)	(9.104)	(12.16)	(7.226)	(6.598)	(9.675)	(8.794)	(11.93)	(7.791)	(11.62)
Observations	923	888	857	857	857	857	857	857	871	873	871
R^2	0.691	0.695	0.698	0.489	0.699	0.699	0.694	0.697	0.701	0.705	0.704
Adjusted R^2	0.679	0.683	0.685	0.467	0.686	0.686	0.681	0.684	0.687	0.692	0.691

Standard errors in parentheses

Table A13 – 2018 Presidential Elections

	Model (1)
(ln) FARC Attacks	-0.827***
	(0.275)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	0.957**
	(0.465)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0963*
	(0.0573)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	-0.734***
	(0.0256)
Poverty Index	0.147***
	(0.0421)
(ln) Population	-2.736***
	(0.580)
Rural Index	-0.00753
	(0.0240)
Coca	-1.224
	(1.085)
Oil	0.0436
	(1.093)
(ln) Elevation	-0.967***
	(0.374)
Education Coverage	-0.00953
	(0.0200)
Department FE	✓
Constant	108.2***
	(10.02)
Observations	857
R^2	0.798
Adjusted R^2	0.789

DV: % Support Iván Duque second round 2018 Presidential Elections
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14 – 2010-2012 Attacks

	Model (1)
(ln) Attacks FARC	5.406**
	(2.140)
(ln) Attacks Para/BACRIM	-2.324*
	(1.392)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0498
	(0.0514)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.575***
	(0.0232)
Poverty Index	0.0174
	(0.0361)
(ln) Population	-0.946**
	(0.394)
Rural Index	0.0829***
	(0.0218)
Coca	2.264**
	(1.024)
Oil	-1.924*
	(0.989)
(ln) Elevation	0.0725
	(0.350)
Education Coverage	0.0128
	(0.0179)
Department FE	✓
Constant	24.14***
	(7.552)
Observations	967
R^2	0.692
Adjusted R^2	0.680

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figures

Figure A1 – Support for the "Yes" in the Colombian 2016 Referendum



Source: *Registraduría Nacional de Estado Civil*

Figure A2 – FARC Presence 2015

Source: International Crisis Group (2016)

Figure A3 – Margins FARC and Paramilitaries/BACRIM



Figure A4 – Dose Response Function FARC



Figure A5 – Dose Response Function Paramilitaries/BACRIM